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REFLECTIONS ON THE TWENTIETH 
ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
THE HONORABLE HALDANE ROBERT MAYER* 
October 1, 2002, marked the twentieth anniversary of the creation 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  On 
April 2, 1982, President Reagan signed the court’s enabling 
legislation,1 and the newly formed court opened for business on 
October 1st of that year.  To commemorate those historic events, the 
court held a special Twentieth Anniversary Judicial Conference in 
Washington, D.C., on April 8, 2002, at which I offered some 
comments on the people and accomplishments of the court in its first 
two decades.  What follows is an adaptation of those remarks, 
updated as of September 30, 2002, the last day of the court’s 
twentieth year. 
The Federal Circuit today is, literally, a different court from the 
one that existed twenty years ago.  Not one of our current active 
judges was a member of the court at its founding.  The original court 
started with eleven active judges:  Chief Judge Howard T. Markey, 
and Judges Daniel M. Friedman, Giles S. Rich, Philip Nichols, Jr., 
Oscar H. Davis, Phillip B. Baldwin, Shiro Kashiwa, Marion T. Bennett, 
Jack R. Miller, Edward S. Smith, and Helen W. Nies.2  There were also 
                                                          
 *  Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  I thank 
Marilyn A. Wennes, Deputy Senior Technical Assistant, for her help in preparing this 
Article. 
 1. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 2. THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: A HISTORY 1982-1990, 361 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
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four senior judges at that time:  Judges Don N. Laramore, James L. 
Almond, Jr., Wilson Cowen, and Byron G. Skelton.3 
Since then, there have been fifteen appointments to the court.  
They are, in order:  Judges Pauline Newman, Jean G. Bissell, Glenn L. 
Archer, Jr., Haldane Robert Mayer, Paul R. Michel, S. Jay Plager, Alan 
D. Lourie, Raymond C. Clevenger, III, Randall R. Rader, Alvin A. 
Schall, William C. Bryson, Arthur J. Gajarsa, Richard Linn, Timothy 
B. Dyk, and Sharon Prost.4  That has resulted in a complete turnover 
in full-time judges.  Of course, Judge Cowen, Judge Friedman, and 
Judge Skelton remain with us as senior judges, and we have in them a 
link to the original court. 
In all, there have been twenty-six active judges on the Federal 
Circuit.  Although that number might sound high, in reality the court 
has been chronically short of judges.  Throughout most of its 
existence—about eighty-two percent of the time—the court has had 
fewer than twelve active judges, its statutory allotment.5  During two 
brief periods, the number dipped as low as eight.  We were aided 
then by visiting district judges, to whom I now renew our gratitude.  
So, we consider ourselves quite fortunate to be back at full strength 
since Judge Prost joined us in the fall of 2001.  I hope we can 
maintain this stability for the foreseeable future. 
As you might expect, all of those judges have had many law clerks 
over the years.  In two decades, there have been 491 law clerks to 
active and senior Federal Circuit judges—or at least, 491 clerkships, 
because a few clerks have served more than once, and are counted 
accordingly.6  In case you’re curious, Judge Rader has had the most 
clerks—thirty-nine in all.  Judge Michel is in second place with thirty-
six, and Judge Schall comes in third, with thirty. 
                                                          
CONFERENCE]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id. (citing nine of the fifteen appointments which took place through 
June 27, 1990); Judicial Biographies, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, at 
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (providing 
information on the remaining six and most recent appointments). 
 5. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (2000) (allowing for twelve judges to be appointed to the 
Federal Circuit). 
 6. The statistics covering the entire existence of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which appear in this piece, have been compiled specifically for Judge 
Mayer’s remarks at the Twentieth Anniversary Judicial Conference.  Therefore, they 
are internal and not available publicly. For further statistical information, see Court 
Information, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, at http://www.fedcir. 
gov/#information (last visited Mar. 3, 2003) (listing information on the appeals filed, 
terminated, and pending from 1997 to 2002); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2 
(discussing the origins of the Federal Circuit, its jurisdiction, and its staff and judges 
from 1982 to 1990). 
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Needless to say, the law clerks have been essential to accomplishing 
the work of the court.  It would be nearly impossible to cope with our 
work without their assistance.  They represent some of the best law 
school graduates in the country, and the judges rely heavily on their 
legal research and writing abilities.  And because the clerks generally 
serve only one- or two-year terms, they are a continual source of fresh 
perspective that we value very highly. 
In addition to the law clerks, we also have an excellent core staff to 
assist us in our work.  We have been very fortunate that the rate of 
turnover among the staff has been quite low compared to that of 
other organizations.  Just to give a few examples, both our court 
Librarian and our Assistant Circuit Executive for Administrative 
Services have been with the court since its inception.  In addition, our 
Assistant Circuit Executive and Chief Deputy Clerk for Operations 
has held various positions in the Clerk’s Office since that time. 
Our Assistant Circuit Executive for Automation and Technology, 
who is responsible for meeting the court’s computer needs, has 
served since that position was created in 1997.  On our central legal 
staff, the Senior Technical Assistant has served since 1983, and the 
Senior Staff Attorney joined the court in 1986.  The knowledge and 
experience of these individuals and other staff members of long 
standing bring efficiency and stability to the court’s day-to-day 
operations.  We appreciate all of the staff for their loyalty and 
dedicated service. 
While we are on the subject of court personnel, I would like to 
make an important point about the court’s legal staff, now known as 
the Central Legal Office.  They provide us with invaluable assistance 
in legal research during the eight day comment period before 
precedential opinions are issued and in handling motions.  However, 
unlike the legal staff of other circuit courts, they are not involved in 
resolving cases on the merits.  At the Federal Circuit, all merits 
dispositions are made by judges.  To do otherwise would risk creating 
a “second class” of litigants before the court, which could undermine 
confidence in our judicial process. 
Now, I’d like to share with you a few statistics on the first twenty 
years of the court’s work.  All of the information that follows is 
current as of September 30, 2002.  Since our court began, the 
Supreme Court has issued forty-four opinions in Federal Circuit 
cases.7 
                                                          
 7. Supra note 6. 
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The most recent opinion,8 Franconia Associates v. United States,9  was 
issued on June 10, 2002. The plaintiffs alleged that the Emergency 
Low Income Housing Act of 1987 abridged their right to prepay their 
government mortgage loans, and consequently, caused both a 
repudiation of the plaintiffs’ contracts with the government and a 
Fifth Amendment taking of their property.10  The Federal Circuit 
held that the claims were untimely filed because they had accrued 
immediately upon passage of the act and had not been filed within 
the six year statute of limitations.11  The Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment and remanded, holding that the claims would not accrue 
until the plaintiffs attempted to prepay their loans and the 
government dishonored its obligation to accept the prepayment.12 
The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.,13 
decided on June 3, 2002, addressed when a claim “arises under” 
federal patent law for purposes of Federal Circuit jurisdiction.14  The 
Supreme Court, vacating the Federal Circuit’s judgment, held that 
under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the Federal Circuit had no 
jurisdiction over a case in which the complaint does not contain a 
patent-law claim, even if the answer contains a patent-law 
counterclaim.15  Such cases are to be appealed to the regional circuits.  
That decision, I fear, will impair the integrity of the system Congress 
envisioned when it created the Federal Circuit.  By granting this court 
exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from cases arising under the 
patent laws, Congress sought to prevent forum shopping and 
promote uniformity in the law.16  That, in turn, reduces uncertainty in 
the outcome of patent litigation, which permits businesses and 
investors to make decisions with confidence.17  Allowing cases 
involving patent claims to be appealed to the regional circuit courts 
could seriously undermine those goals. 
                                                          
 8. The Supreme Court subsequently decided White Mountain Apache Tribe and 
Navajo Nation on March 4, 2003.  See infra notes 23-25. 
 9. 536 U.S. 129 (2002). 
 10. Id. at 132-33. 
 11. Id. at 133-34. 
 12. Id. 
 13. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002). 
 14. Id. at 827, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1801. 
 15. Id. at 833, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805. 
 16. Id. at 832 & n.3, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804 & n.3. 
 17. See Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Mach. Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736, 744 & n.7, 13 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (en banc), overruled by The Holmes Group, 
Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 
(2002) (discussing the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, supra note 1). 
FINALJUDGEMAYERFOREWORD.PRINTER.DOC 8/15/2003  1:37 PM 
2003] FOREWORD 765 
On May 28, 2002,  the Court issued its decision in Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.18  The Court agreed with the 
Federal Circuit that narrowing claim amendments in order to satisfy 
any Patent Act requirements—not just those made to avoid prior art 
—may give rise to prosecution history estoppel.19  However, the Court 
disagreed with the Federal Circuit’s “complete bar” approach—the 
notion that, where estoppel applies, the patentee necessarily 
surrenders all subject matter between the broader and narrower 
claim language.20  The Court then explained the circumstances under 
which the doctrine of equivalents would still apply despite a 
narrowing amendment, and vacated and remanded the case to the 
Federal Circuit for a determination of whether such circumstances 
exist.21  We will reconsider the case en banc.22 
Two other Federal Circuit cases were pending at the Supreme 
Court at the end of September:23  White Mountain Apache  Tribe v.  
United States24 and Navajo Nation v. United States.25  They were argued 
on December 2, 2002.  Both cases concern the nature of the federal 
government’s fiduciary obligations to the tribes involved.26 
You might also be interested to know that, in its first twenty years, 
the Federal Circuit has issued more than seventy-five judgments en 
banc in whole or in part.27  The most recent of those28 is Jaquay v. 
                                                          
 18. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002). 
 19. Id. at 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714. 
 20. Id. at 737-38, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1715 (rationalizing that a complete bar 
would defeat the purpose of the doctrine, which is to hold the inventor accountable 
to the representations made during the application process). 
 21. Id. at 741-42, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1717. 
 22. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 304 F.3d 1289, 
1291, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1698 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ordering a rehearing of the case 
remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 23.  The Supreme Court decided White Mountain Apache Tribe and Navajo Nation 
on March 4, 2003.  United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 121 S. Ct. 1126 
(2003) (statute providing that government hold property in trust for tribe, subject to 
government’s right to use property, obligated government to preserve property it 
used and could fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for breach of that 
obligation), aff’d, 263 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002); United States v. Navajo Nation, 121 
S. Ct. 1079 (2003) (statute requiring approval of Secretary of Interior for mineral 
leases negotiated between tribe and lessee could not be fairly interpreted as 
mandating compensation for the government’s alleged breach of trust), rev’d, 263 
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 24. 249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 535 U.S. 1016 (2002), aff’d, 123 
S. Ct. 1126 (2003). 
 25. 263 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 535 U.S. 1111 (2002), rev’d, 123 
S. Ct. 1079 (2003).  
 26. Id. at 1325; White Mountain Apache Tribe, 249 F.3d at 1364. 
 27. See supra note 6. 
 28. The court subsequently decided Coast Federal Bank, FSB v. United States, 323 
F.3d 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc), on March 24, 2003.  Because the court did not 
decide to rehear that case en banc until after September 30, 2002, it is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  See Coast Federal Bank, FSB v. United States, 320 F.3d 1338 
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Principi,29 which issued on September 16, 2002, and concerns the 
statutory 120-day period for appealing a decision of the Board of 
Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) to the Court of Appeals for Veterans 
Claims (“Veterans Court”).30  That period begins to run from the 
mailing date of the Board’s initial decision.31  If, however, the veteran 
seeks reconsideration of the Board’s initial decision within the 120-
day period, that decision is “abated,” and the period for appeal to the 
Veterans Court begins anew upon the mailing of the subsequent 
Board decision.32 
Jaquay’s representative tried to file a motion for reconsideration 
within the 120-day period, but mailed it to a Department of Veterans 
Affairs regional office, instead of the Board’s Washington, D.C. office, 
as required by regulation.33  Some ten months later, the motion 
reached the Board, which denied it.  Jaquay appealed to the Veterans 
Court within 120 days of that denial.  The court dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction on the grounds that the notice of appeal was not filed 
within 120 days of the Board’s initial decision, and that filing the 
reconsideration motion with the wrong office neither abated that 
decision nor reset the 120-day period for appeal to the court.34  On 
appeal, the en banc Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, holding 
that filing for reconsideration at the regional office satisfied the 
diligence requirement of Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs35 and 
thus triggered equitable tolling.36  The Federal Circuit held that the 
Board’s initial decision was abated by that filing, Jaquay’s notice of 
appeal to the Veterans Court was timely, and the Veterans Court 
possessed jurisdiction of the case.37 
As of September 30, 2002, four cases were pending before the en 
banc Federal Circuit.  Two of them have since been decided.  In 
Schism v. United States,38 which issued on November 18, 2002, the en 
banc court held that in spite of government officials’ promises of free 
lifetime medical care for career military officers and their 
                                                          
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (order granting rehearing en banc). 
 29. 304 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 30. Id. at 1279. 
 31. Id. at 1281 (citing to 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a)(1)(2000)). 
 32. Id. at 1284 (citing Rosler v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 241, 249 (1991)); see also 
id. at 1279 (“‘[A] new 120-day period begins to run on the date on which the BVA 
mails to the claimant notice of its denial of the motion to reconsider.’” (quoting 
Rosler, 1 Vet. App. at 249)). 
 33. Id. at 1279, 1284 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 20.1001 (2001)). 
 34. Id. at 1278, 1279. 
 35. 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990). 
 36. Jaquay, 304 F.3d at 1288-89. 
 37. Id. at 1289. 
 38. 316 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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dependents, and in spite of the officers’ reliance on those promises 
by serving on active duty for at least twenty years, the promises were 
unenforceable for want of authority.39  In Cook v. Principi,40 decided on 
December 20, 2002, the court held that although the Veterans’ 
Administration (now the Department of Veterans Affairs) failed to 
give Mr. Cook a proper medical examination before denying his 
claim for service-connected benefits, that failure did not render the 
decision denying benefits non-final, and thus, the claim could not be 
reopened.41  In doing so, the court held that a breach of the duty to 
assist the veteran to the extent required by law could not constitute 
“clear and unmistakable error,” one of the two statutory exceptions to 
finality.42  The court also overruled Hayre v. West43 insofar as Hayre 
holds that “grave procedural error” constitutes an additional, non-
statutory exception to finality.44 
Two cases still await decision en banc.  In addition to Festo, discussed 
earlier, there remains Martinez v. United States.45  In Martinez, we asked 
the parties to brief whether Hurick v. Lehman,46 a 1986 Federal Circuit 
case, should be overruled.47  Hurick holds that a claim based on an 
alleged unlawful discharge from military service accrues on the date 
of discharge.48  The statute of limitations is not tolled by seeking relief 
from a military board for the correction of records, and the failure of 
that board to set aside the discharge does not give rise to a separate 
claim.49 
The Federal Circuit is a prolific producer of precedential opinions.  
In its lifetime, the court has issued over 4000 of them.50  On average, 
therefore, we write more than 200 precedential opinions a year.  That 
is a number I believe we should work to reduce.  Too many opinions 
in well-trod areas of the law contribute to uncertainty and instability. 
                                                          
 39. See id. at 1300 (explaining that Congress was the only body vested with 
authority over health care for the armed forces and that it had neither delegated this 
authority to other entities nor ratified the promises made). 
 40. 318 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 41. Id. at 1347-48. 
 42. See id. at 1344 (stating that in order to constitute clear and unmistakable 
error, the error must be outcome determinative and it must have been based upon 
evidence in the record of the original decision). 
 43. 188 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 44. Cook, 318 F.3d at 1348; see also Hayre, 188 F.3d at 1333 (discussing “grave 
procedural error” and its effect on the finality of decisions). 
 45. 272 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (sua sponte granting hearing en banc). 
 46. 782 F.2d 984 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 47. Martinez, 272 F.3d at 1335. 
 48. Hurick, 782 F.2d at 986. 
 49. Id. at 987. 
 50. See supra note 6. 
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The number of precedential opinions, however, reflects only a 
fraction of our caseload.  As of September 30, 2002, 30,593 appeals 
have been filed since the court began.51  About forty-three percent of 
those have come from the Merit Systems Protection Board.  Twenty-
two percent have come from the district courts, eleven percent from 
the Court of Federal Claims, seven percent from the Patent and 
Trademark Office, and five percent from the Court of Appeals for 
Veterans Claims.52  The Boards of Contract Appeals and the Court of 
International Trade have each contributed about four percent.  That 
accounts for ninety-six percent.  The remaining four percent of 
appeals have come from our “writs” category, the International Trade 
Commission, the Department of Veterans Affairs, our congressional 
“personnel” category, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and the Office of Personnel Management. 
That quick review of the various sources of our appeals illustrates 
how broad and varied our court’s jurisdiction really is.  Of course, 
that was the idea from the very beginning.  When Congress created 
the Federal Circuit, it was well aware of concerns that the new court 
would be overly specialized.  So it conferred on us the combined 
jurisdiction of two predecessor courts, which was quite diverse, as well 
as appeals from the Merit Systems Protection Board and appeals from 
the district courts in patent cases.53  And because we have jurisdiction 
over patent “cases,” not “issues,” we frequently encounter many other 
types of questions not committed to our exclusive jurisdiction.54 
Congress also intended to expand our jurisdiction as the need 
arose, and indeed it has done so.  Since 1982, we have received 
jurisdiction over at least ten new types of cases, including those 
involving veterans’ benefits, the Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, and energy cases that previously went to the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals.55 
It has also been Congress’s aim that the Federal Circuit should 
hold hearings outside of Washington, D.C. from time to time.  Thus, 
in keeping with our statutory mandate, we have heard arguments in 
other circuits on twenty-eight occasions in the first twenty years.56  
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). 
 54. See Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 1435-36, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1074 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing jurisdiction over patent “cases” as opposed to “issues”), 
overruled on other grounds by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 
1059, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc in relevant part). 
 55. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at pt. V (discussing the types of cases 
that come before the Federal Circuit). 
 56. See 28 U.S.C. § 48 (2000) (authorizing the Federal Circuit to hold court 
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And we have heard arguments in every regional circuit in the 
country.  These hearings have been held not only at federal 
courthouses, but also at law schools in those areas.  We believe this 
provides law students with a valuable chance to observe the appellate 
process in general, and the work of this court in particular.  Our 
judges have also typically participated in continuing legal education 
programs hosted by local bar associations.  And of particular value, 
we take those opportunities to meet with the district judges whose 
work we see, but whom we rarely get to meet. We always enjoy these 
opportunities to share our views with the judges, and the lawyers who 
practice before us, and to learn what’s on their minds, as well. 
On a personal note, my association with the Federal Circuit goes 
back to the mid-1970s when what was to become the court was but a 
gleam in the eye of Professor Dan Meador of the law school at the 
University of Virginia, who I see as the “father” of the court.  
Traditionalist that I am, I can recall demurring to the idea in 
conversations with Dan.  Even after my former boss, Chief Justice 
Burger, indicated his support, I still was not sure. Little did I know 
that I was destined to spend my judicial career with the Federal 
Circuit:  first as a trial judge keeping a wary eye on it, and for the past 
fifteen years on the court. 
This twentieth anniversary is an opportune time to take stock and 
see how the court is faring.  It is appropriate to pause and glance 
back.  But it is the future that should command our attention.  This 
Federal Circuit issue is a good place to begin that process. 
                                                          
outside Washington, DC). 
